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Jenkins: Transgender Asylum

COMMENT
TAKING THE SQUARE PEG OUT
OF THE ROUND HOLE:
ADDRESSING THE
MISCLASSIFICATION OF
TRANSGENDER ASYLUM
SEEKERS
INTRODUCTION

It was a watershed victory for the gay and lesbian
community when United States courts first recognized that
sexual orientation was a legal ground for membership III a
particular social group for asylum-seeking purposes.! This
1 In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990).
Prior to 1990, sexual
orientation was not recognized as a protected social group for purposes of asylum
applications. With the landmark Toboso-Alfonso decision, sexual orientation was
recognized as immutable. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) specifically noted
that "the service has not challenged the immigration judge's finding that
homosexuality is an 'immutable characteristic' nor further 'that that characterization
is subject to change."' Id. at 820-22. In 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno designated
Toboso-Alfonso as administrative precedent, affirming that "an individual who has
been identified as homosexual and persecuted by his or her government for that reason
alone may be eligible for relief under the refugee laws on the basis of persecution
because of membership in a social group." Memorandum from Attorney General Janet
Reno to Mary Maguire Dunne, Acting Chair, Board of Immigration Appeals 1 (June 16,
1994), available at http://www.qrd.org/qrdlworldlimmigration/us.gay .asylum. policy01.23.95); see also Eric D. Ramanathan, Queer Cases: A Comparative Analysis of
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gave an unprecedented number of gay and lesbian asylum
seekers the ability to escape persecution in their countries of
origin and begin new lives in the United States. Although
transgender individuals fall under the lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender (LGBT) umbrella, they present a distinct set
of issues that serve to distinguish them from gay and lesbian
asylum seekers.
In the social schema, trans-identified
individuals may be more visible, viewed as more transgressive
of social norms, and thus subject to greater discrimination and
persecution within a society.2 From the judicial perspective,
trans gender individuals can present blurred social and
biological paradigms, often resulting in an erroneous
adjudication contrary to the applicant's identity. Although the
judicial system has recently begun to affirm the rights of
trans gender and transsexual individuals in the civil and
employment context, there is a dearth of case law recognizing
the trans-community in the immigration context, and
specifically, transgender asylum applicants.
For purposes of obtaining asylum, many transgender
individuals are forced to embrace membership in the social
group "homosexual" even though this accepted social group
does not always match a transgender applicant's sexual
orientation. The transgender identity as a man or a woman is
distinct from the broad range of sexual orientations the
trans gender community encompasses. 3
Consequently, the
homosexual particular social group subsumes a trans gender
asylum applicant into a sexual identity he or she may not
possess.
This erroneous application leaves the claimant
without accurate legal recognition.
Global Sexual Orientation-Based Asylum Jurisprudence, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 20-21
(1996).
2 See generally INT'L GAY AND LESBIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, SEXUAL
MINORITIES AND THE WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON TORTURE
(June 5, 2001) (describing how doctors and nurses routinely leave transvestites to wait
for hours in emergency wards, even if there are no other patients; in Mexico, twenty
transvestites were kept for five nights in a cell measuring three square meters. They
were denied both food and blankets); see also Arwen Swink, Note, Queer RefUge: A
Review of the Role of Country Condition Analysis in Asylum Adjudications fOr
Members ofSexual Minorities, 29 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 251, 253 (2006).
3 Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and
Legal Conceptualization of Gender That is More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253, 260-61 (2005) ("Transgender people have all sexual
orientations: some transgender people are straight, some are gay, some are bisexual,
and some are queer."). Id. at 270.
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The limited interpretation of the appropriate social group
the federal circuits have applied to transgender asylum claims
reflects prevalent misunderstandings that permeate this social
and biological identity.4 The social group currently applied to
transgender
individuals
is
socially
inaccurate
and
unnecessarily narrow. Instead, the immigration system should
adopt a separate and distinct social group for transgender
applicants so they can legitimately claim lawful grounds for
asylum. To allay criticisms that recognition of the trans gender
identity for asylum purposes may result in an amorphous
particular social group, there are comparable legal victories for
the trans gender community in the civil and employment
contexts warranting similar protection in the immigration
court system.
Part I provides the basic definitions and understandings
this Comment will adopt within the transgender paradigm and
provides an overview of United States asylum procedures and
the immigration court structure. Part II discusses asylum
applications based on sexual orientation and will address how
subsequent cases have erroneously applied this social group to
transgender applicants. Part II further highlights examples of
adjudicatory issues that transgender asylum seekers may face
as a result of not identifying as homosexual.
Part III
showcases the recognition and protection afforded to
transgender plaintiffs in pivotal civil discrimination cases and,
as a result, how their rights have been correspondingly
protected. This Comment concludes with a recommendation
that the immigration judicial system modify its current
definition of "particular social group" to explicitly recognize the
"transgender identity" for asylum purposes.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

TRANSGENDER IDENTITY

Throughout the course of Western history, society has
constructed gender norms that often assume individuals are
4 Throughout this paper, when referring to the claimants highlighted in the
court decisions discussed, I will use the appropriate pronoun for the applicant's gender
identity. Many of the decisions erroneously refer to the applicant using a pronoun that
coincides with the sexual identity assigned to them at birth.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2009

3

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 4

70

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

born male or female and should behave accordingly.5 The
transgender term encompasses an individual whose anatomic
sex may conflict with their gender expression and whose birth
sex does not match their internal perception of their gender
identity. 6 Broadly speaking, "sex" is typically used to refer to
an individual's identity as it relates to biology, including, but
not limited to, chromosomal and/or reproductive composition. 7
In contrast, "gender" may be based on an individual's social
identity as related or unrelated to sex but often involving
culturally associated masculine or feminine norms. 8
A
transgender individual presents a unique gender identity that
the general public is often ignorant of or misunderstands. 9
It is important to note that there is no direct causal
connection between gender identity and sexual orientation.lO
Gender identity is who one is, whereas sexual orientation
describes those to whom one is attracted. l l Transgender
individuals may identify as heterosexual, lesbian, bisexual,
gay, queer, and any number of other categories of sexual
orientations. 12 Accordingly, when discussing and practicing the
law surrounding transgender issues, it is important not only to
understand the appropriate terms but also to look to what
terms the individual prefers to use when defining himself or

5 Amanda S. Eno, Note, The Misconception of "Sex" in Title VII· Federal Courts
Reevaluate Transsexual Employment Discrimination Claims, 43 TULSA L. REV. 765,
766 (2008) (citing Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 15, 24, 32 (2003) (discussing how society sets out standards for how
people should act within their gender category)).
6 See generally TRANSGENDER RIGHTS (Paisley Currah, Richard M. Juang, &
Shannon Price Minter eds., 2006).
7 Francine Tilewick Bazluke & Jeffrey J. Nolan, "Because ofSex'~· The Evolving
Legal Riddle ofSexual vs. Gender Identity, 32 J.C. & V.L. 361, 362 (2006).
8 d.
I
9 Cf. Transgender Law Ctr., Top 5 Tips for Working with Transgender Clients
and
Co-Workers,
http://transgenderlawcenter.org/pdf!I'op%205%20tips%20on%20clients%20and%20coworkers.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2009) (stressing the importance of being aware of
gender assumptions, using the correct name in all correspondence, and inquiring into
medical history and surgery).
10 Vade, supra note 3, at 270; see also Ben Lunine, Transitioning Your Services:
Serving Transgender Victims of Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault and Stalking, 'II 5,
http://www.transgenderlawcenter.org/pdflLunineSummer2008.pdf (last visited Dec. 1,
2009).
II Vade, supra note 3, at 270.
12
Id.
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herself as indicative of that person's gender identity.13
B.

AsYLUM PROCEDURE IN THE UNITED STATES

Asylum law in the United States finds its foundational and
substantive support in the United Nations Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees, commonly referred to as the Geneva
Convention. 14 Enacted subsequent to the mass shifting of
refugees worldwide following World War II, the Geneva
Convention has been interpreted by various state actors
broadly and in response to a variety of changing
circumstances. 15 In 1968, the United States adopted the
Protocol to the United Nations Convention Relating the Status
of Refugees (U.N. Refugee Protocol), which encompassed the
16
Geneva Convention's basic terms.
The United States has
subsequently incorporated the U.N. Refugee Protocol's
definition of asylum into its body of immigration law. 17 The
text of the U.N. Refugee Protocol, therefore, remains the
essence of asylum jurisprudence in the United States. IS
The U.N. Refugee Protocol's definition of refugee, as
articulated in section lOl(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), provides protection to any person who
can establish a well-founded fear of being persecuted on
13 JOAN M. BURDA, GAY, LESBIAN, AND TRANSGENDER CLIENTS: A LAWYER'S
GUIDE, 3 (2008).
14 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, arl. 1, opened for signature
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, reprinted in 19 U.S.T. 6259 (entry into force Apr. 22,
1954); see also Monica Saxena, More Than Mere Semantics: The Case for an Expansive
Definition ofPersecution in Sexual Minority Asylum Claims, 12 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
331,336 (2006).
15 Saxena, supra note 14, at 336.
16 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. I § 2, opened
for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entry into force Oct. 4,
1967); see also DEBORAH ANKER, THE LAW OF AsYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (3d ed.
1999); Paul O'Dwyer, A Well-Founded Fear of Having My Sexual Orientation Asylum
Claim Heard in the Wrong Court, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 185, 187 (2007-2008).
17 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1l01(a)(42)(A)
(Westlaw 2009); see also ANKER, supra note 16, at 4. In 1952, the McCarran-Walter
bill- passed into law as the Immigration and Nationality Act - consolidated previous
immigration laws into one statute. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
Congress later passed the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980)
(codified at various sections of 8 U.S.C. and 22 U.S.C.). See generally Thomas
Alexander Aleinikoff et al., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 17378 (6th ed. 2008).
18 See O'Dwyer, supra note 16, at 187.
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account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the
country of his or her nationality, and, due to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that
country. 19 "A well-founded fear" involves an assessment based
on both subjective and objective elements of the prospective
asylee's claim. 20 Therefore, under U.S. immigration law, an
applicant may qualify for asylum either because the applicant
has suffered past persecution or because he or she has a wellfounded fear of future persecution, but only if the applicant can
point to a nexus between the persecution and one of the five
protected grounds. 21
Transgender asylum applicants who have been subject to
19 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1l01(a)(42)(A)
(Westlaw 2009); see also Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, 19
U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entry into force Apr. 22, 1954).
20 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, 'II 1, 8 §§ 37-38, U.N. Doc.
HCR/IP/4/ENGIREV
(1992),
aV811able
at
http://www.unhcr.org/cgibinltexislvtxlsearch?page=search&docid=3d58e13b4&query=handbook%200n%20proce
dures%20and%20criteria%20for%20determining%20refugee%20status. ("Since fear is
subjective, the definition involves a subjective element in the person applying for
recognition as a refugee. Determination of refugee status will therefore primarily
require an evaluation of the applicant's statements rather than a judgment on the
situation prevailing in his country of origin. To the element of fear - a state of mind
and a subjective condition - is added the qualification 'well-founded.' This implies
that it is not only the frame of mind of the person concerned that determines his
refugee status, but that this frame of mind must be supported by an objective situation.
The term 'well-founded fear' therefore contains a subjective and an objective element,
and in determining whether well-founded fear exists, both elements must be taken into
consideration."). The UNHCR Handbook goes on to explain that "[tjhere is no
universally accepted definition of 'persecution,' and various attempts to formulate such
a definition have met with little success ... [ilt may be inferred tlIat a threat to life or
freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a
particular social group is always persecution. Other serious violations of human rights
- for the same reasons - would also constitute persecution." Id. at 10 § 51. "Needless
to say, it is not possible to lay down a general rule as to what cumulative reasons can
give rise to a valid claim to refugee status. This will necessarily depend on all the
circumstances, including the particular geographical, historical and ethnological
context." Id. at § 53. The UNHCR Handbook has been recognized by the United States
Supreme Court as persuasive authority when interpreting the U.N. Refugee Protocol.
See generally INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427 (1999); INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437-39 (1987).
21 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (Westlaw 2009): A showing of past persecution creates a
presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution, which the government may rebut by
a preponderance of the evidence that either country conditions have changed to such a
degree that a well-founded fear of future persecution does not exist or that the person
could safely relocate within the country of origin; see also O'Dwyer, supra note 16, at
191.
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genuine and violent persecution on account of their sexual
identity often do so under the "membership in a particular
social group" umbrella. The U.N. Refugee Protocol does not
provide a definition of "particular social group." As a result,
the courts have had to fashion their own definitions of what
constitutes membership in this category.22 The Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) stated that a "particular social
group" comprises members who possess an immutable
characteristic, one that members cannot change or should not
be required to change because it is fundamental to their
individual identities or consciences. 23 However, this definition
is binding only on immigration judges and Department of
Homeland Security employees. 24 In Hernandez-Montiel v.
INS,25 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reconciled its "particular social group" definition set forth in an
earlier decision with that of the BIA. 26 It is now settled that
LGBT applicants who have been persecuted on account of their
sexual orientation must satisfy definitions determined under
the protected category of "particular social group" in order to
satisfY asylum requirements. 27
C.

IMMIGRATION COURT STRUCTURE AND PRECEDENTIAL
IMPACT

With the exception of asylum granted by asylum officers,
an immigration judge is involved in proceedings for all
defensive applications for asylum and withholding of removal

22 Christi Jo
Benson, Note, Crossing Borders: A Focus on Treatment of
Transgender Individuals in US. Asylum Law and Society, 30 WHI'ITIER L. REV. 41, 54
(2008).
23 In re Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985), overruled in part on other
grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987), abrogated by
Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1997).
24
8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(g) (Westlaw 2009).
25 Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000).
26 [d. at 1093.
After Acosta, the Ninth Circuit, in Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS.,
broadened the Acosta requirement of immutability, ruling that "particular social group
implies a collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by
some common impulse or interest. Of central concern is the existence of a voluntary
associational relationship among the purported members, which imparts some common
characteristic that is fundamental to their identity as a member of that discrete social
group." Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
27 Victoria Neilson, Uncharted Territory: Choosing an Effective Approach in
Transgender-Based Asylum Claims, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J 265, 270 (2005).
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and also serves as a second review of denials of asylum made
by asylum officers. 28 The BIA is the administrative body that
hears appeals from the immigration court. Each year the BIA
publishes approximately 50 decisions out of the roughly 4,000
cases that it hears.29 These serve as binding precedents for
immigration judges. 3o
If the BIA rules against a claimant, he or she may appeal
to the federal court of appeals with jurisdiction over the case. 3!
The decisions of a court of appeals are binding on the
immigration courts within that court's circuit, as well as on the
BIA when it reviews cases that originate in that circuit. 32 If a
"court of appeals adopts a different rule than the BIA, the new
rule will be applied within that court's circuit in future cases.,,33
Consequently, the law applied by the BIA or an immigration
judge can differ by federal circuit when there is a split between
the circuits or when a particular issue has been decided in one
circuit but not another.34 As a result of the small number of
published cases, the even smaller number designated as
precedent, and the precedential impact of the courts of appeals
on various immigration courts around the country, different
definitions and criteria have been established, leading to
confusion
and
at
times
contradictory
immigration
35
adjudications.
28 Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231 (Westlaw
2009) ([T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney
General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that country
because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.).
29 Neilson, supra note 27, at 267.
30 STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAw AND POLICY (4th ed.,
2005) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2004)).
31 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(a)(2)(O), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(2)(0)
(Westlaw 2009).
32 Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995) ("A federal agency is
obligated to follow circuit court precedent in cases originating within that circuit.")
(citing NRLB v. Ashkenazy Prop. Management Corp., 817 F.2d 74, 75 (9th Cir. 1987)
(overruled on other grounds by Parussimovo v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.
2008))); see also O'Dwyer, supra note 16, at 193.
33 Alan G. Bennett, The "Cure" That Harms: Sexual Orientation-Based Asylum
and the Changing Definition of Persecution, 29 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 279, 285
(1999).
34 O'Dwyer, supra note 16, at 193.
35 Neilson, supra note 27, at 267. Because of the dearth of published opinions, it
is difficult to determine or analyze whether important decisions, and corresponding
trends, are occurring within the system. At the BIA level few decisions are released; of

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol40/iss1/4

8

Jenkins: Transgender Asylum

2009]
II.

TRANSGENDER ASYLUM

75

ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT TRANSGENDER PARTICULAR
SOCIAL GROUP

While a claim of homosexuality is now an accepted means
of establishing membership in a particular social group for
asylum purposes, the BIA and the courts of appeals have yet to
recognize a claim of transgender or transsexual identity in a
similar way.36 The Ninth Circuit has come the closest to
affording protection to transgender applicants by utilizing a
specific set of descriptors, without directly stating that those
who possess a transgender or transsexual identity constitute a
distinct social group for purposes of asylum. 37 Section A of this
part discusses attempts by various circuit courts to apply a
social group to trans gender applicants and the resultant
creation of an unnecessarily narrow and arbitrary social group.
This is highlighted in Section B by two examples of legal
hurdles a prospective transgender applicant might face under
current asylum law.

A.

THE CREATION OF A SOCIAL GROUP FOR TRANSGENDER
APPLICANTS BY THE COURTS OF APPEALS

1.

Hernandez-Montiel v. INS: Beginning to Recognize the

Transgender Asylum Applicant
In 2000, the Ninth Circuit first addressed the case of a
trans gender asylum applicant, holding in Hernandez-Montiel
these published decisions, the vast majority involve asylum denials. Id.; see also
Leonard Birdsong, "Give Me Your Gays, Your Lesbians, and Your Victims of Gender
Violence, Yearning to Breathe Free of Sexual Persecution . .. ':. The New Grounds for
Grants of Asylum, 32 NOVA L. REV. 357,373-74 (2008) (citing Stuart Grider, Sexual
Orientation as Grounds for Asylum in the United States-In re Tenorio, No. A 72 093
558 (EOIR Immigration Court, July 26, 1993), 35 HARV. lNT'L L.J. 213, 215 (1994).
Moreover, the number of published opinions, including circuit decisions, addressing
LGBT issues is minuscule. This creates a system in which it is nearly impossible for
the claimant or the immigration judge to discern clear standards necessary to establish
a successful asylum claim, and particularly a claim based upon sexual orientation and
identity persecution. See generally Robert C. Leitner, Comment, A Flawed System
Exposed: The Immigration Adjudicatory System and Asylum for Sexual Minorities, 58
U. MIAMI L. REV. 679, 695-99 (2004).
36 In re Toboso-Alfonso, 201. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990).
37 Joseph Landau, "Soft Immutability" and "Imputed Gay Identity": Recent
Developments in Transgender and Sexual-Orientation-Based Asylum Law, 32
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 237,246 (2005).
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v. INS. that "gay men with female sexual identities in Mexico"
constituted a "particular social group" for the purposes of
asylum. 3s Hernandez-Montiel, a Mexican national the court
referred to as "Geovanni," realized at the age of eight "that [he]
was attracted to people of [his] same sex.'>39 Beginning at age
twelve, Geovanni began dressing and behaving as a woman. 40
Geovanni faced repeated and consistent abuse and persecution
at the hands of both private individuals and government
officials. 41 After Geovanni was expelled from school for refusing
to change sexual orientation, Geovanni's parents threw
Geovanni out of their home. 42 When Geovanni was fourteen
years old, police officers forced Geovanni into their car, drove to
a deserted area, and forced Geovanni to perform oral sex. 43
Two weeks later, Geovanni was raped by the same officers.44
Geovanni fled to the United States at age fifteen but was
arrested and returned to Mexico several days later.45 Upon
return to Mexico, Geovanni lived with a sister who attempted
to "cure" Geovanni's sexual orientation. 46
She enrolled
Geovanni in a counseling program, which altered Geovanni's
female appearance by cutting Geovanni's hair and nails in a
masculine style, and forced Geovanni to discontinue taking
female hormones. 47 Geovanni again entered the United States
on or around October 12, 1994, and applied for asylum and
withholding of deportation within the year. 48
The Ninth Circuit in Hernandez-Montiel expressly held
that a "particular social group" is "one united by a voluntary
association . . . or by an innate characteristic that is so
fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members
that members either cannot or should not be required to
change it.')49 Based on testimony from leading experts in Latin

Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1094 (9th Cir. 2000).
Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1087 (brackets in original) .
• 0 Id.
• 1 Id. at 1088 .
• 2 Id.
'3 Id.
4. Id.

38

39

,5 Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1088.
,6 Id.

Id.
Id. at 1089.
,9 Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093 (emphasis in original).

47

.8
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American history and culture, Geovanni was able to convince
the court of the longstanding persecution of "gay men with
'female' sexual identities in Mexico" by police and other groups
within the society. 50 The court stated in a footnote that
"Geovanni's brief states that he [sic] 'may be considered a
transsexual.",51 Despite this, the court went on to state "[w]e
need not consider in this case whether transsexuals constitute
a particular social groUp."52 Nevertheless, the court's ruling in
favor of Geovanni signaled a greater inclusiveness for
transgender asylum applicants, broadened the Ninth Circuit's
definition of "particular social group" and brought it into
greater alignment with the BIA's definition. 53 However, by
recognizing the particular social group of "gay men with female
sexual identities," rather than "transsexuals" it created a
particular social group that was unnecessarily limiting and
arguably sociologically incorrect as related to Geovanni's sexual
orientation. 54

2.

The Ninth Circuit Continues to Recognize the "Gay Men
with Female Sexual Identities" Particular Social Group

The broadened definition of "particular social group" under
which an asylum seeker could apply was upheld in two later
5
Ninth Circuit decisions, Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcrod and OrnelasChavez v. Gonzales. 56 In Reyes-Reyes, the court affirmed its
recognition of a "homosexual male" with a "deep female
identity" by overturning the lower court's removal order for the
Id. at 1089.
I d. at 1095 n.7. The court then dermed a transsexual as "a person who is
genetically and physically a member of one sex but has a deep-seated psychological
conviction that he or she belongs, or ought to belong, to the opposite sex, a conviction
which may in some cases result in the individual's decision to undergo surgery in order
to physically modify his or her sex organs to resemble those of the opposite sex." Id.
(citing Deborah Tussey, Annotation, Transvestism or Transsexuaiism of Spouse as
JustifYing Divorce, 82 A.L.R.3d 725 n. 2 (1978)).
52 Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1095 n.7.
53 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233-34 (B.I.A. 1985) (derming "particular
social group" to "mean persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a
member of a group of person all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic").
54 The Hernandez-Montiel court did not directly discuss what Geovanni's sexual
orientation was, rather, it automatically ascribed "homosexual" to him without any
discussion.
55 Reyes-Reyes v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2004).
56 Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2006).
50
51
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Salvadoran transgender petitioner. 57
Reyes-Reyes was
ineligible for asylum because the application was filed after the
one-year deadline. 58 However, Reyes-Reyes was eligible for
relief under two "withholding of removal" statutes, both of
which have requirements similar to those of an asylum
application. 59 Although the court used the male pronoun "he"
when referring to the applicant, it included the term
"transsexual" in a footnote, which affirmed the term Reyes's
counsel used throughout the proceeding. so The court stated,
"[w]e note, however, that Reyes's sexual orientation, for which
he [sic] was targeted, and his [sic] transsexual behavior are
intimately connected."sl
While the decision affirmed the expansive definition of
"particular social group" the Ninth Circuit continues to apply to
prospective trans gender asylum seekers,S2 it does not go far
enough. The Reyes-Reyes court unnecessarily interrelated
Reyes's sexual orientation and transsexual identity and refused
to accurately recognize Reyes's female identity,S3 despite the
fact that, according to the court, she had transitioned prior to
the proceeding. Instead, the court described Reyes-Reyes
throughout the opinion as a "homosexual male," without any
discussion of whether Reyes-Reyes actually identified as
homosexual while simultaneously acknowledging that ReyesReyes-Reyes, 384 F.3d at 785, 789.
I d. at 786-87.
59 I d. at 787-89.
First, Reyes-Reyes was eligible for withholding of removal
under the Convention Against Torture, which creates a mandatory prohibition against
returning someone to a country if "it is more likely than not that he or she would be
tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal." 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)
(Westlaw 2009). Reyes-Reyes was also eligible for withholding of removal under
Immigration and Nationality Act § 241 (b)(3), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(b)(3) (Westlaw 2009),
under which he could not be removed if his "life or freedom would be threatened." IRA
J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 383 (lOth ed. 2006) (citing
Article 33 of the Protocol).
60 Reyes-Reyes, 384 F.3d at 785 n.1.
61 d.
I
62 Hollis V. Pfitsch, Homosexuality in Asylum and Constitutional Law: Rhetoric
ofActs and Identity, 15 LAw & SEXUALITY 59, 70 (2006) (citing Reyes-Reyes, 384 F.3d
at 787).
63 Reyes-Reyes, 384 F.3d at 785 n.1.
The court interconnected Reyes-Reyes's
sexual identity and sexual orientation despite noting that urals we have recognized, it
is well-accepted among social scientists that '[slexual identity is inherent to one's very
identity as a person . . . . Sexual identity goes beyond sexual conduct and manifests
itself outwardly, often through dress and appearance.'" Id. (quoting Hernandez-Montiel
v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000)).
57

58
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Reyes did not identifY as a "male."
In Ornelas-Chavez, the Ninth Circuit upheld its earlier
recognition of gay men with female sexual identities, again
providing protection to a transgender woman under this
narrow and misleading descriptor. 64
Ornelas-Chavez, a
Mexican national, was beaten and raped on several occasions
by male family members, and then shunned by family
throughout childhood and early adolescence. 65 Ornelas-Chavez
reported the sexual abuse to a teacher who, rather than notifY
the authorities, responded that she "shouldn't do that because
only homosexuals did that.',s6 After arrest and detention by the
local police chief, who was trying to "teach" Ornelas-Chavez "to
behave," Ornelas-Chavez was told that the detention would be
extended if the police chief "found out again he [sic] was
sexually involved with men.',s7 At a later date, two of OrnelasChavez's homosexual acquaintances were killed by the police. 68
The men were found stabbed to death with sticks inserted in
their rectums. 69 Ornelas-Chavez later moved to another part of
Mexico and resided there for five years without significant
harm.70
However, then Ornelas-Chavez's father arrived
unexpectedly, attacked her, and broke her nose with a bottle.71
Ornelas-Chavez then fled Mexico for the United States. 72
The immigration judge and BIA denied asylum, on the
73
basis that a six-hour detention did not constitute persecution.
The remaining claims of persecution failed because OrnelasChavez failed to report them to government authorities. 74 The
Ninth Circuit ultimately reversed and remanded the case,
holding that Ornelas-Chavez was not required to report the
persecution if caused by a private party the government was
unwilling or unable to control. 75 Although the decision did not
Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1054.
66
Id.
67 Id. (first "[sic]" in original).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70 Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 154-55.
71 Id. at 1055.
72
Id.
73 d.
I
74
Id.
75 Ornelas-Chavez, 458 F.3d at 1058 (stating that an applicant who seeks to
establish withholding of removal "on the basis of past persecution at the hands of
64

65
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discuss the claimant's sexual orientation directly, the court
stated that "[w]hether Ornelas-Chavez belongs to a protected
social group [was] not at issue in this appeal," referring to the
"gay men with female sexual identities in Mexico" social group
that was affirmed in Hernandez-Montiel. 76 Both the ReyesReyes and Ornelas-Chavez decisions indicate recognition by
the Ninth Circuit of a particular social group as applied to
transgender applicants.
However the Ninth Circuit has
consistently limited this group to "gay men with female sexual
identities" from Latin America.
3.

Morales v. Gonzales: Recognition ofa Transsexual Asylum
Applicant

The 2007 decision of Morales v. Gonzales77 marked the
Ninth Circuit's first use of the term "transsexual" in the body of
an immigration decision, referring to the asylum applicant as a
"male-to-female transsexual.,,78 Morales, a Mexican national,
was identified at birth as male and began using a female
identity at age fourteen because "she always felt that she was
more of a female than a male.,,79 During her hearing, Morales
claimed she was raped by her brother at a young age and on
several other instances occasions by other individuals. 80
Morales also stated that she was arrested several times for
dressing as a woman. 8!
The facts indicate that Morales
returned to Mexico once to receive breast implants and that she
has since feared returning to Mexico because "she is 'more' of a
woman now," and as a result, was more likely to be assaulted
in Mexico. 82
Morales invoked her asylum claim as a defensive strategy
against charges by Immigration and Customs Enforcement
that she was an alien present in the United States who has not

private parties the government is unwilling or unable to control need not have reported
that persecution to the authorities if he can convincingly establish that doing so would
have been futile or have subjected him to further abuse").
76 Id. at 1056.
77 Morales v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007).
78 Morales, 478 F.3d at 975.
79 Id. at 976.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
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been admitted or paroled83 and she was removable because she
was convicted of communication with a minor for immoral
purposes, a crime of moral turpitude. 84 Consequently, the court
did not have to determine Morales's particular social group, as
her crime ultimately made her ineligible for asylum. 85
Interestingly, the court mentioned the immigration judge's
inquiry into the Mexican government's position on transgender
people and made a determination that, ''but for Morales's
conviction for communication with a minor for immoral
purposes, [the immigration judge] would have found her
eligible for asylum under Hernandez-Montiel v. IN8.,,86
However, in marked distinction from Hernandez-Montiel, there
was no identification of Morales as a gay man with a female
identity, either by the court or by Morales herself. Rather, the
court expressly referred to her as a male-to-female transsexual,
noted that she had had breast-implant surgery, and referred to
her using the feminine pronoun. 87
Based on the finding that Morales was ineligible for
asylum and withholding of removal, the Ninth Circuit was able
to sidestep the implications of Morales's transsexual identity
and her asylum application based on a well-founded fear of
persecution. 88 However, if the case had rested solely on
Morales's membership in a particular social group, the court
would have been forced to determine whether Morales's
identity was legally and sociologically appropriate under the
established Hernandez-Montielparticular social group.
The aforementioned cases highlight the unnecessarily
limited definition of "particular social group" as the
83 Morales, 478 F.3d at 977; see also Immigration and Nationality Act §
212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (Westlaw 2009).
84 Immigration
and Nationality Act § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(l), 8 U.S.C.A. §
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(l) (Westlaw 2009).
85 Morales, 478 F.3d at 984.
The Ninth Circuit remanded the asylum and
withholding of removal claims because the immigration judge erroneously relied on
facts pertaining to a crime of which Morales was not convicted. Id. at 984-85.
88 Id. at 977,984.
87 Id. at 975-76.
88 Id. at 985.
The Ninth Circuit determined the immigration judge applied an
incorrect legal standard in determining that Morales was ineligible for Convention
Against Torture (CAT) relief and remanded for further proceedings. The CAT does not
require that the persecution be on account of one of the five protected grounds. 8
C.F.R. § 208. 16(c) (Westlaw 2009). The CAT was ratified by the United States Senate
under the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, as implemented by
section 2242. See Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681,2681-821 (1998).
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"homosexual male with female identity" that has been applied
to transgender applicants with varying gender and sexual
orientation identifications. It is notable that there was no
indication the Ninth Circuit made any attempt to determine
the applicants' sexual orientation. Instead, the court defaulted
to the descriptor "homosexual male," despite the fact that the
applicants may have identified as heterosexual females.
B.

NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE HERNANDEZ-MoNTIEL
APPROACH FOR TRANSGENDER APPLICANTS

1.

The "Conduct VS. Identity" Distinction

While great strides have been made for homosexual
asylum applicants, significant gaps remain that may have a
troubling effect upon transgender applicants. The test for
"particular social group" rightly remains contextual and fluid.
However, In re Toboso-Alronso established that the
requirement of membership in a particular social group focuses
on identity to the exclusion of conduct. 89 Consequently, as
asylum law currently stands, only persecution on the basis of
identity (not conduct that reflects identity) merits protection. 90
This "conduct versus identity" distinction has particular
consequences for the trans gender applicant who may not
identify as homosexual and thus has not engaged in
"homosexual" acts.
Two recent cases that highlight this
distinction are Kimumwe v. Gonzalel 1 and Maldonado v.
Attorney General of the United States. 92 Although neither of
these cases involves a transgender or transsexual applicant,
they present analogous issues and difficulties that a
transgender applicant would face under a court's scrutiny and
analysis.
89 Pfitsch, supra note 61, at 70; see also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION
AND REFUGEE LAw AND POLICY 994 (4th ed. 2005) (stating that Alfonso-Toboso
established that a claimant could be persecuted solely for being homosexual, as
distinguished from engaging in homosexual acts).
90 Pfitsch, supra note 61, at 70 ("As the law currently stands, an LGBT
immigrant persecuted on the basis of her homosexual conduct may not be granted
asylum if she does not sufficiently identity as LGBT or if her persecution is rooted in
laws regulating sexual activity rather that focusing on sexual identity.").
91 Kimumwe v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 319 (8th Cir. 2005).
92 Maldonado v. Attorney Gen. of U.S. , 188 F. App'x 101 (3d Cir. 2006).
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In Kimumwe, the Eighth Circuit upheld the immigration
judge and BIA's finding that the applicant was punished for his
improper sexual conduct, rather than his sexual orientation. 93
Kimumwe was expelled from secondary school in Zimbabwe at
the age of twelve for having sexual relations with another male
student. 94 Later, Kimumwe and another male student, a
sixteen-year-old whom Kimumwe claimed to be in love with,
got drunk together and had sex. 95 Mter the other boy
complained to authorities about the incident, Kimumwe was
arrested and detained by the police, ostensibly under a sexualassault charge, although the jailer indicated it was because of
Kimumwe's homosexuality.96 Kimumwe was detained for two
months, charged with sodomy and sexual assault, and released
only after prison officials were bribed. 97 The immigration judge
found that Kimumwe's problems in Zimbabwe "were not based
simply on his sexual orientation, but instead resulted [from]
his engaging in prohibited sexual conduct."98
The Eighth Circuit held the immigration judge and BIA's
99
distinction between identity and conduct was justified. The
court stated that since any sexual conduct between students
was illegal, Kimumwe would have been expelled whether
Kimumwe had sex with a boy or a gir1. 100 The court affirmed
the immigration judge's finding that "the actions of
Zimbabwean authorities in these instances were not based on
Kimumwe's sexual orientation, but rather on Kimumwe's
involvement in prohibited sexual conduct."lol The Eighth
Circuit also cited to the immigration judge's finding that
Kimumwe presented no objective evidence to confirm his
homosexuality. 102 Although the majority focused on the police
statement, which stated that the alleged sexual misconduct
was the basis for Kimumwe's arrest, there was no evidence in
the record that indicated whether the other boy, who was not
Kimumwe, 431 F.3d at 323.
Id. at 322.
95 Id. at 321.
96 d.
I
97
Id.
98 Id. (brackets in original).
99 Kimumwe, 431 F.3d at 322.
100 Id.
93
94

WIld.
102

Id. at 321.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2009

17

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 4

84

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

gay, was arrested or charged with any sexual misconduct. l03
Further, the majority ignored the fact that the political and
social climate in Zimbabwe at the time was blatantly hostile
toward homosexuals.l0 4 In a well-reasoned dissent, Justice
Heaney disputed the immigration judge's finding that
Kimumwe was not a homosexual and that he "was not
punished because of his status as a homosexual, but rather
because of the apparently coercive circumstances in which he
engaged in sexual activity."105
The reasoning behind the Eighth Circuit's holding is
disconcerting, particularly because individuals persecuted for
one of the other established categories are not held to the same
exacting standard of proving their identity. For instance, a
claim of religious persecution would not be opposed or denied
on the ground that the persecution is solely for praying or
attending services; instead, the persecution would be treated as
being on account of the individual's belonging to a particular
religion. 106 Yet this "conduct versus identity" distinction IS
applied to the detriment of homosexual applicants. 107
103
104

Id. at 322.
As Judge Heaney wrote in his dissent:

In 1995, [Presidentl Mugabe publicly referred to gays as 'sodomites and perverts'
and declared that homosexual people had 'no rights at all.' Mugabe's anti-gay
rhetoric became stronger soon thereafter, attacking Britain's tolerance of
homosexuals, [whol Mugabe believed were 'worse than dogs and pigs.' In
speeches, Mugabe has promised that Zimbabwe will do 'everything in its power'
to combat homosexuality and has described homosexual relations as 'an
abomination and decadence.' Mugabe remains in power today.

Id., 431 F.3d at 324 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
105 The immigration judge stated that Kimumwe presented no objective evidence
to confirm his homosexuality, despite the fact that Kimumwe testified he was openly
gay and realized he was gay at seven years old. Kimumwe, 431 F.3d at 323-24.
106 O'Dwyer, supra note 16, at 196.
107 Id.; see also Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2005) (overturning
the immigration judge's fmding and BIA's affirmance that denied asylum to a
Lebanese homosexual with AIDS on the basis of the conduct versus identity
distinction). The Ninth Circuit found significant problems with the Attorney General's
argument that "the future persecution Karouni fears would not be on account of his
status as a homosexual, but rather on account of him committing future homosexual
acts." Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1172 (emphasis in original). Similarly, the Court quoted
part of the immigration judge's oral decision, which stated that "[tlhere has been
evidence to show that individuals are prosecuted for homosexual conduct. [But tlhere
has been no evidence that mere homosexuality is against the law in Lebanon." Id. In
overturning the immigration judge and BIA, the Ninth Circuit held there can be "no
appreciable difference between an individual, such as Karouni, being persecuted for
being a homosexual and being persecuted for engaging in homosexual acts." Id. at
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In contrast to Kimumwe, the Third Circuit, in Maldonado
v. Attorney General of the United States,I08 took a different
approach to the BIA and immigration judge's arbitrary
"conduct versus identity" distinction.
Maldonado, an
Argentinean applicant, was repeatedly harassed and detained
by police over twenty times during the course of several years,
often while leaving gay clubs. 109 In one incident, the police
detained Maldonado for over six hours, during which he was
told by the police that "you faggots deserve to die" and "you
need a hot iron bar stuck up your ass.,,110 Both the immigration
judge and the BIA adopted the government's contention that,
while the allegations may be true, they were not inflicted "on
account of' his membership in a particular social group, but
instead on account of his leaving gay clubs late at night, acts
that the applicant was free to modifY.lll The Third Circuit
overturned the IJ and BIA's ruling, finding it was "a distinction
without a difference. The fact that Maldonado was targeted by
the police only while engaged in an elective activity does not
foreclose the possibility that he was persecuted on account of
his membership in a particular social groUp.,,1l2 The Third
Circuit remanded the case to the BIA for further review. 1l3
Kim um we and Maldonado illustrate the illusory
distinction that courts continue to make when adjudicating
asylum applications for persecution on account of homosexual
conduct, rather than identity, in order to justifY denials of relief
to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender applicants. This
arbitrary differentiation is not applied to protection sought by
claimants who are not sexual minorities. 1l4 In the cases
discussed above, at least petitioners Kimumwe and Maldonado
could claim membership in a protected social group,
homosexuals, to bolster their claim. This holds potentially
serious consequences for transgender applicants, as they may
not identifY as either lesbian or gay. Consequently, while they
may engage in what others would identifY as homosexual acts,
1173.
Maldonado v. Attorney Gen. of U.S. 188 F. App'x 101 (3d Cir. 2006).
[d. at 103.
llO [d.

108
109

[d. at 104; see also O'Dwyer, supra note 16, at 203.
Maldonado, 188 F. App'x at 104.
ll3 [d. at 105.
ll4 O'Dwyer, supra note 16, at 196.
III

ll2
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their identity may be heterosexual, thus calling into question
their protection under the accepted particular social group,
homosexual.

2.

Imputed Gay Identity

To address the conduct and identity distinction discussed
above, critics have encouraged transgender applicants to take
advantage of the "imputed gay identity" theory, in which the
homosexual label has been applied by the persecutors instead
of the applicant individual. 115 This would allow trans gender
applicants to prove their cases without necessarily having to
establish that their persecutors targeted them because of their
transgender identity. 116
As Joseph Landau points out,
"[a]dvancing the imputed gay identity theory has the
advantage of placing transgender asylum seekers into a
category of persons already deemed eligible for 'particular
social group' status as opposed to having to persuade a factfinder that transgender persons organically constitute a
particular social group.,,117
The conceptual underpinnings of the "imputed gay
identity" theory are found in Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 118 a Third
Circuit decision from 2003. Amanfi, a Ghanaian man, claimed
persecution by members of a cult and by the Ghanaian police,
both of which viewed him as a homosexual, although Amanfi
did not identifY as a homosexual. 119 Amanfi claimed he was
approached by several men, claiming to be police, who drove
him to an isolated area and locked him in a room. 120 However,
the men were not police but "macho men," essentially private
security guards hired by individuals to settle disputes. 121 The
men told Amanfi that his father was murdered and that a
similar fate would befall him. 122
Amanfi believed the men planned to offer him as part of a

Landau, supra note 36, at 258.
116 Neilson, supra note 27, at 288.
117 Landau, supra note 36, at 258.
118 Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719 (3d Cir. 2003).
119 Id. at 72l.
120 Id. at 723.
121 Id.
115

122

Amanfi, 328 F.3d at 723.
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human sacrifice. 123
Based on this belief, and on an
understanding that the cult believed homosexuals were not
suitable for human sacrifice, Amanfi engaged in a homosexual
act with another man kept captive by the "macho men.,,124
When they were discovered, Amanfi and the other man were
severely beaten before being brought to the police, who
125
informed the public that Amanfi was a homosexua1.
Amanfi
claimed the police beat him daily for nearly two months until
he was able to escape from captivity.126 Amanfi did not identify
himself as a homosexual. 127 Nevertheless, his captors imputed
his homosexual conduct into a homosexual identity and
persecuted him based on this belief. 128 Amanfi argued that his
claims should be analyzed from the perspective of him imputed
status as a homosexual rather than actual membership in this
. I group. 129
socIa
The BIA reasoned that Amanfi could not qualify as a
member of the homosexual social group because he testified
that he was not in fact a homosexual. 13o The BIA opined that
extending the imputed political opinion rationale to imputed
sexual orientation status was "without any legal precedent."131
The Third Circuit reversed the BIA, holding imputed identity
on account of perceived sexual orientation was legally
sufficient. 132 The Third Circuit found that Amanfi's claim of
imputed membership in a particular social group,
homosexuals,133 was consistent with other circuit opinions
discussing imputed political opinion, 134 as well as precedential

124

Id.
Id.

125

Amanfi, 328 F.3d at 723.

123

Id.
Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 724.
130 Amanfi, 328 F.3d at 724.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 719.
133 Id. at 729.
134 Amanfi, 328 F.3d at 729 n.4 (citing AI Naijar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1289
(l1th Cir. 2001) (acknowledging that proof of an imputed political opinion would have
qualified as persecution "on account" of political opinion under Immigration and
Nationality Act); Morales v. INS, 208 F.3d 323, 331 (lst Cir. 2000) ("There is no doubt
that asylum can be granted if the applicant has been persecuted or has a well-founded
fear of persecution because he is erroneously thought to hold a particular political
opinion."); and Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 509 (7th Cir. 1998) ("One way that an
126

127
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BIA cases and administrative regulations and letters. 135
Consequently, for the first time, a claim of imputed homosexual
status based on the persecutor's beliefs was recognized by a
court without regard to the applicant's actual sexual
orientation.
Many countries have no concept of "transgender," resulting
in the perception that all gender non-conforming behavior is
synonymous with homosexuality.136 When the persecutory act
relates to the victim's sexual orientation, the imputed gay
identity may afford transgender individuals a pathway to
asylum. Under current U.S. asylum law, the claimant must
not only show a well-founded fear of persecution but must also
produce corroborating evidence that the persecutor's intent was
premised upon a belief about his or her sexual orientation. 137
While the doctrine of imputed gay identity may provide a
viable avenue of relief for transgender applicants, it is not clear
whether claims based on imputed membership in other
particular social groups would be successful. 138 In the case of
adjudicators who do not understand the distinction between
gender identity and sexual orientation, this may lead to
unpredictable results. For instance, if persecutors attacked a
heterosexual transgender woman solely for exhibiting traits
that fall outside the gender norms in that country (and not for
being perceived as a homosexual woman), then she has not
been persecuted for homosexuality, imputed or not. Under the
Hernandez-Montiel particular social group, as well as the
imputed gay identity, she would be left without an established

applicant can establish 'political opinion' under the INA is to show an imputed political
opinion.")).
135 65 Fed. Reg. 76588, 76597-98 (proposed Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.15(b)) (An asylum applicant must demonstrate membership in one of the five
protected categories (race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group or political opinion) or "on account of what the persecutor perceives to be the
applicant's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion."). At present, these regulations have not yet been promulgated. See
also INS General Counsel Opinion Letter, Genco Op. No. 93-1, 1993 WL 1503948 (INS)
("Persecution inflicted because the persecutor erroneously imputes to the victim one of
the protected characteristics set forth in Section 101(a)(42) can constitute persecution
'on account of that characteristic for the purposes of asylum or refugee analysis.").
136 Landau, supra note 37, at 261.
137 INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482-84 (1992) (holding that an asylum
applicant must provide some direct or circumstantial proof of persecutor's motive).
136 Neilson, supra note 27, at 285-86.
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means of redress under current asylum law. 139
III. THE TRANSGENDER IDENTITY AS A DISTINCT PARTICULAR
SOCIAL GROUP FOR PURPOSES OF AsYLUM

The creation of a "transgender" particular social group as
distinct from the previously identified "gay men with female
sexual identities" serves the purposes of being more inclusive
to the broad array of transgender identities. Currently, this
particular social group accounts for a narrow subset of people
persecuted on account of their sexual identity and orientation.
In comparison, if a heterosexual female with a deep male
identity is subject to persecution, the court would have to
create a new particular social group to accurately reflect this
identity. The same would be true for an asexual male with a
female identity. These claims can be made simpler by adopting
a single social group to which they all belong: the trans gender
particular social group.
Instead of requiring an applicant to prove the intent of the
persecutor and to then produce corroborating evidence of the
imputed identity, courts should recognize that persecution "on
account of' a transgender or transsexual identity satisfies the
requirements for establishing asylum. If the BIA established
by precedent that transgender identity was part of an
established particular social group, it would not be necessary
for applicants to circuitously prove the erroneous sexual
orientation their persecutor attributed to them, thus making
the burden of proof in an asylum case more accessible for
transgender applicants.
A potential criticism of the creation of a transgender
particular social group is that it would lead to a flood of
fraudulent claims.140 It is impossible to refute or affirm this
139 Id. at 281 n.1D2 (stating that a person who put forward a claim based on
homosexual orientation who did not consider himself or herself to be a homosexual
could be considered a "frivolous" claim. A "frivolous" claim is defined as an application
in which "any of its material elements is deliberately fabricated."). Id. (citing 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.20 (West 2008)). Following the same logic, the court could make a frivolous
fmding against an individual who filed a claim for persecution on account of "imputed
homosexuality" if the claimant could not show that the persecutor was motivated to
persecute because of his or her erroneous perception.
140 Lauren Smiley, Border Crossers, SF WEEKLY, Nov. 26, 2008, at 13, available
at http://www.sfweekly.coml2008-11-26/newslborder-crossersl1 (citing Dan Stein,
president of the Federation for American Immigration Reform, a national organization
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criticism, as the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Service does not break down its general asylum statistics
according to the basis of the claim.141 Accordingly, there are no
official statistics to indicate the number of sexual orientation or
gender identity asylum claims filed or approved. 142 Another
criticism is that a "transgender social group" might be "mired
in obfuscation and ambiguity."143 Perhaps in response to these
criticisms, the courts have rejected claims for asylum on the
rationale that the persecution claimed is too prevalent or the
proposed social group is too broad. 144 For example, the Ninth
Circuit has avoided "sweeping categories"145 and has suggested
that social groups should be "readily identifiable.,,146
In turn, asylum applicants have proposed a broad range of
group definitions, using descriptors to fit within the contours of
a social group that is narrow and "readily identifiable.,,147
However, once a narrow and descriptive particular social group
is developed, it has the problematic outcome of creating a
checklist for judges seeking a particular type of trait on the
part of the applicant before recognition of his or her
membership. 148 As society in the United States often conflates
aimed at curbing illegal immigration).
141 Deborah A. Morgan, Not Gay Enough for the Government: Racial and Sexual
Stereotypes in Sexual Orientation Asylum Claims, 15 LAW & SEXUALITY 135, 141
(2006).
142 I d. at 142, n.38 ("One estimate indicates that over the five year period from
1994 to 1999, which spans the inclusion of homosexuals as a 'particular social group,'
the Attorney General 'granted asylum to about 300 gays and lesbians.'") (citing Denise
C. Hammond, Immigration and Sexual Orientation: Developing Standards, Options,
and Obstacles, 77 No.4 INTERPRETER RELEASES 113,118 (Jan. 24, 2000».
143 Michael A. Scaperlanda, Kulturkampf in the Backwaters: Homosexuality and
Immigration Law, 11 WIDENER J. PuB. L. 475, 505 (2002) (describing decisions
following Toboso-Alfonso and questioning whether persons with a disfavored sexual
orientation can constitute a "particular social group").
144 B.J. Chisholm, Comment, Credible Definitions: A Critique of Us. Asylum
Law's Treatment ofGender-Related Claims, 44 HOW. L.J. 427, 441 (2001).
145 I d. (citing Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1573 (9th Cir. 1986».
146 Id. (citing Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1092 (9th Cir. 2000».
147 I d. at 432-33 (citing Matter ofR-A-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 629, 630, Interim Decision
3624 (B.LA. September 25, 2008) ("Guatemalan women who have been involved
intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to live
under male domination."); Matter of Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (BIA 1996)
("young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had [female genital
mutilation), as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice."».
148 Cf. Morgan, supra note 140, at 154 (arguing that immigration judges make
decisions based on racialized sexual stereotypes and culturally specific notions of
homosexuality, thus discriminating against those who do not conform).
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gender and sexual identity, transgender individuals face a
heightened struggle with stereotypes in asylum proceedings. 149
Accordingly, this could lead to arbitrary and erroneous
decisions made on the basis of stereotypes and
misconceptions. 150 For example, an immigration judge could
encounter a transgender male claimant who has not yet begun
taking testosterone or other hormone injections and has not
had surgery to remove his breasts for fear of persecution, yet
has always felt he was more male than female. As the asylum
adjudicators mirror the misconceptions of society, the result is
that a transgender person might be stigmatized both for being
transgender and then as a homosexual, even though the
151
transgender applicant may identify as heterosexual.
Accordingly, education and training of adjudicators on the
fluidity of the gender identity is critical. 152
Judicial precedent forces a transgender applicant who is
not homosexual to adjust the contours of his or her claim so as
to fall within the established Hernandez-Montiel social
group. 153 This places an unfair burden on the applicant. The
solution is for the BIA and the courts of appeals to hold that
transgender people form a particular social group, thus
creating a more inclusive social group that recognizes the fluid
gender/sex dichotomy.154
In fact, one commentator has
suggested that "the relevant social group could be framed as
'individuals born with one anatomical sex who believe their
149 Benson, supra note 22, at 57 (citing Nat!. Ctr. for Transgender Equal. &
Transgender L. Ctr., The Real ID Act: Bad Law for Our Community ['II. 7],
http://www .realnightmare.org/imagesiFileINCTE %20realid. pdf).
150 Morgan, supra note 140, at 154
(positing that adjudicators' own narrow
understanding of sexual identity encourages fraudulent sexual orientation claims
because typical questions posed to determine if an applicant is "really gay" reveal
unconscious adherence to sexual stereotypes).
151 I d. (citing PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A
HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLICYMAKERS 8 (2000), available at
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloadslreportslreportslTransgenderEquality.pdf).
152 I d. at 159-60. (Training would provide "concrete, factual reference information
on the various ways in which sexuality is expressed around the world, as well as
developing methods by which judges could assess whether they were employing
stereotypes in their decision making.").
153 Neilson, supra note 27, at 276 ("There is no precedent directly addressing
asylum based solely on transgender identity.").
154 Id. at 277 (stating that although most transgender individuals do not fmd
their sex or gender to be immutable, the debate surrounding the rigidity of gender and
sex should not preclude a fmding that transgender identity can form the basis of
membership in a particular social group).
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anatomical sex does not match their gender.',,155
An illustrative example of this type of recognition is the
limited advances the federal courts have made in extending
protection
to
transgender
victims
of
employment
discrimination on account of gender. While rare, they are
indicative of the advances courts are making toward full
recognition of the transgender identity.
However, one
distinction from asylum decisions is that the courts are
accurately describing claimants as transgender or transsexual
and, in some cases, affording them relief based on this
recognition, rather than applying a multitude of qualifiers.
Several courts have given an expansive interpretation of what
constitutes gender discrimination, based, in part, on the
reasoning behind the United States Supreme Court's 1989
decision Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 156 In that decision the
Court addressed harassment directed at a woman who did not
conform to traditional gender stereotypes, holding that Title
VII's l57 reference to "sex" encompassed both the biological
differences between men and women and gender
discrimination based on a failure to conform to stereotypical
gender norms. 158
The Ninth Circuit was the first to adopt a broad
interpretation of "sex" in deciding Schwenk v. Hartford 159
Although the case did not involve Title VII, the court
nevertheless concluded that a transgender plaintiff could prove
sex-harassment was discrimination by showing that the
harasser's conduct was motivated by a belief that the plaintiff
failed to conform to gender stereotypes. 160 The First Circuit has
155

Id.

156 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (Title VII prohibits an
employer from discriminating against a woman who was considered to be too
masculine).
157 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a) (Westlaw 2009) ("It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin .... ").
158 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.s. at 250-5l.
159 Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1200 (9th Cir. 2000) (protection under
the Gender Motivated Violence Act extends to transsexuals).
160 Id. at 1202; see also Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874
(9th Cir. 2001) (extending Schwenk and holding that claimant had claim under Title
VII based on comments made by male co-workers and supervisor, repeatedly reminding
claimant that he did not conform to their gender-based stereotypes, by referring to him
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also afforded transgender claimants protection outside the
employment context, by reinstating an Equal Credit
Opportunity Act claim on behalf of transgender plaintiff who
alleged that he was denied an opportunity to apply for a loan
because he was not dressed in masculine attire. 161
The Sixth Circuit has gone the furthest in affording
protection to transgender claimants by explicitly stating that
Title VII protected transgender employees. In Smith v. City of
Salem, Ohio,162 the court held that discrimination against a
transgender person who failed to act in accordance with his
anatomical sex was no different than the discrimination faced
by the plaintiff in Pnce Waterhouse. 163 The court held that the
use of labels such as "transsexual" or "homosexual" would not
affect claims by plaintiffs alleging discrimination because of
their gender nonconformity. 164 In addition, several district
courts have impliedly or explicitly held that Title VII extends
protection to transsexuals. 165
It should be noted that most circuits continue to deny
protection to transgender applicants alleging discrimination on
the basis of "sex." However, some courts are beginning to
acknowledge that transgender individuals constitute a
legitimate demographic and are entitled to protection under

as "she" and "her.").
161 Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000).
162 Smith v. City of Salem, 369 F.3d 912 (6th Cir. 2004) (amended & superseded
by Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
163 Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Barnes v.
City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming the Smith decision by
holding that discrimination against a transgender woman based on a person's gender
non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination under Title VII); Myers v.
Cuyahoga County, 182 F. App'x 510, 519 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that "Title VII
protects transsexual persons from discrimination for failing to act in accordance and/or
identify with their perceived sex or gender").
164 Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Shannon H.
Tan, When Steve is Fired ror Becoming Susan: Why Courts and Legislators Need To
Protect Transgender Employees from Discrimination, 37 STETSON L. REV. 579, 591
(2008).
165 See Tronetti v. TLC HealthNet Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03-CV-0375E(SC), 2003
WL 22757935, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2003) (holding that "[tlranssexuals are not
gender-less, they are either male or female and are thus protected under Title VII to
the extend that they are discriminated against on the basis of sex."); Schroer v.
Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 205 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that a male-to-female
transsexual plaintiff was "not seeking acceptance as a man with feminine traits," but
rather wanted acceptance to express her identity as a female, not as a feminine male).
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this identity.166 Courts adjudicating asylum petitions should do
the same. While claimants in the asylum context are arguably
afforded relief more consistently than those seeking protection
within the federal employment-discrimination context, the
immigration courts do so by automatically ascribing a
"homosexual" identifier to those claimants.

IV. CONCLUSION
As case law currently stands, transgender asylum
applicants have only a narrowly defined particular social
group, generally that of homosexual men with female identities
from Latin America, that they may use as a basis of protection
from persecution. However, these finite descriptors have the
potential to preclude a successful claim if the applicant does
not satisfy one of the criteria. Although one has to hope that
the BIA or a court of appeals would liberally extend the same
protection afforded the petitioner in Hernandez-Montielto, say,
a transsexual female-to-male from Eastern Europe,167 existing
decisions would not force this outcome, and courts could far too
easily distinguish those circumstances from those found in
previous decisions.
While gender-nonconforming individuals have won some
legal battles in the past few years, namely by courts beginning
to acknowledge a broadened concept of sex and gender, the
courtroom continues to be a daunting forum for gendernonconforming people to seek asylum. Recent Ninth Circuit
opinions recognize that trans gender individuals constitute a
legitimate minority who are being persecuted because of
gender variances. However, without express affirmation by the
BIA or the federal courts of appeals that the transgender
identity constitutes a distinct and particular social group for
purposes of asylum,168 transgender and transsexual individuals
are forced to subsume themselves into discrete and established
social groups that have been accorded recognition by the
courts. Requiring applicants to do so commits further violence
Eno, supra note 5, at 790.
At present there is a dearth of case law concerning female-to-male transgender
applicants, whether straight or gay-identified. See generally Landau, supra note 36, at
263 ("One drawback is the one-sidedness of the Ninth Circuit's rulings, which fail (at
least for now) to protect female-to-male transgender persons.").
16B Neilson, supra note 27, at 274.
166
167
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on an already-persecuted identity. The ethical principles of the
asylum system were designed to afford protection to those most
marginalized. This inclusive system is fluid and contextual,
and thus courts are able to adjust the concept of a "particular
social group" to legally and sociologically align the applicant
with an appropriate group. Transgender applicants are not
seeking special protection, but rather equal protection under
the law.
Consequently, the courts should broaden their
existing transgender social group and create one that accounts
for varying transgender and transsexual identities.
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